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I. INTRODUCTION
Sam Brown is in his early twenties. He has a drug problem and has
been in and out of courts throughout his life, once on a murder charge. Sam
moves to a small town in upstate New York, and over the course of two
years, he goes on a killing spree. He selects his victims from among the
town's most vulnerable youths. He finds them outside schools and in the
local park. He picks teenagers with family problems, high school dropouts,
and even a thirteen-year-old ninth-grader. These kids go with him
voluntarily. They do not know the danger they are in or that Sam is carrying
a deadly weapon with him wherever he goes. One at a time, Sam kills ten of
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legal writing instructor at the University of Miami School of Law in the 1999-2000 school
year. Ms. Markus extends her thanks to David Markus, Prof. Carol Steiker, and her family.
1
Markus: A Treatment for the Disease: Criminal HIV Transmission/Exposure L
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
the girls. Although his crimes are detected, Sam is not put on trial. Why
does Sam escape prosecution?
Sam Brown's real name is Nushawn Williams.! Mr. Williams, who is
HIV-positive, is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with at least forty-
eight females2 after having learned of his HIV status in 1996, and to have
kept a tally of the women with whom he had intimate relations.3 At least
thirteen of these females (ages thirteen to twenty-two) are believed to have
contracted the HIV virus from Mr. Williams,a ten of them after he learned he
was HIV-positive. Two of these women have given birth to HIV-positive
babies.5 One young man was also infected when he had sex with one of the
females.6 Absent a medical breakthrough, these sixteen people will die of
HIV7 as a result of Mr. Williams' actions.'
1. With only minor alterations, this could be the story of other HIV-transmitters as well.
For example, in Vicksburg, Mississippi, 52 women identified an HIV-positive man as the
source of their venereal disease infection, and 12 of them, ages 14-20, also have tested
positive for HIV. See Shannon Brownlee et al., AIDS Comes to Small-Town America, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 10, 1997, at 52.
In Missouri and Illinois, a man named Darnell McGee, who tested positive for HIV in
1992, infected at least 30 women and had sex with hundreds more. See Kristina Sauerwein,
Some HIV Carriers Don't Care Who They Have Sex With, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 23,
1997, at B1.
In Traverse City, Michigan, an HIV-positive man named James Jones had sex with at
least 10 females, ages 15-35, without disclosing his HIV-infection and usually without using
condoms. See Jim Dyer and Kristin Storey, In Traverse City: HIV Carrier Ignites Town Sex
Scandal, THE DErROrT NEwS, Dec. 19, 1997, at Cl. It is not known whether any of these
women actually contracted the disease. See John Flesher, HIV-Infected Man to be Charged
With Failing to Notify Partners, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL
4897239.
2. Henry L. Davis, Latest Tests Reveal Williams Allegedly Infected 13 Women,
BuFFAO NEwS, Dec. 10, 1997, at B4. These 48 women had sexual relations with 85 other
people. Id. In addition, 10 of Mr. Williams's sexual partners in New York City have tested
positive for HIV, but it is not known if they contracted the disease from Mr. Williams or from
someone else. See Richard Perez-Pena, Two Births Lengthen List in One-Man H.I. V. Spree,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at B5.
3. See Brownlee, supra note 1.
4. See Davis, supra note 2.
5. See Perez-Pena, supra note 2.
6. See Davis, supra note 2.
7. Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") is the name given to a virus that invades
the body's immune system. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") describes a
number of related conditions that are usually, but not always, the actual cause of death in the
people infected with the HIV virus. See Eric L. Schulman, Sleeping With the Enemy:
Combatting the Sexual Spread of HIV-AIDS Through A Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 957, 962-63 (1996). For the purposes of this article, both AIDS and HIV
will be referred to as HIV.
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Nonetheless, the only crime for which Mr. Williams has been charged
thus far is statutory rape for his sexual relationship with the thirteen-year-old
girl who contracted HIV from Mr. Williams. Prosecutors likely will not
charge him with murder or attempted murder because they would be unlikely
to get a conviction. 9 There is strong circumstantial evidence that these
women contracted HIV from Mr. Williams, in light of the women's youth,
their relatively limited number of sexual partners, and the fact that these
crimes took place in a small town.' ° Yet, proving murder or attempted
murder will be difficult for other reasons. For one thing, the women are still
alive and are likely to outlive Mr. Williams, who contracted the virus before
the women. Additionally, evidence of intent to kill, an element of both
murder and attempted murder, is unavailable.
Mr. Williams may be charged with assault in the first degree and/or
reckless endangerment, which carry maximum sentences of twenty-five and
seven years, respectively."1 However, proving these crimes will also be
difficult, because they require a showing of present physical injury, which
might require proof that the victims are showing symptoms. Furthermore,
the prosecution would have to show that the victims contracted the disease
from Mr. Williams, which is also challenging to prove. Similar prosecutions
in other states, against other modem day "Typhoid Harrys, ' ' 2 have not been
successful for these reasons. 3 Thus, Mr. Williams may well serve no time
for the deaths of these women. Moreover, Mr. Williams' conduct as to the
numerous other women who were put at risk of contracting the disease, but
did not actually contract it, will go unpunished.
8. While new treatments such as protease inhibitors have improved the conditions of
HIV-infected people, there is no cure for the disease. See id. at 959. It is invariably fatal.
9. Jennifer Tanaka & Gregory Beals, The Victims' Stories, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1997,
at 58-59.
10. Unlike larger, more populous areas, Chautauqua County employs only one full-time
contract tracer. Because this one individual was informed of each positive test result from Mr.
Williams' victims, he was able to identify the links between them and therefore to determine
Mr. Williams' identity. See Richard Perez-Pena, Tracing an HIV Outbreak, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Nov. 16, 1997, at A27. Had this epidemic occurred in a jurisdiction with more contact
tracers, Mr. Williams might not have been identified as the source of the infections. Id.
11. See Brian A. Brown, The Charge is Murder, the Weapon AIDS, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 1997, at 10.
12. Tanaka & Beals, supra note 9, at 55.
13. See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, Attempted-Murder Charges Dropped in AIDS-Blood
Case, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec. 2, 1987, at A03 (discussing dismissed attempted murder
charge against a defendant who sold AIDS-infected blood to a plasma bank); Joseph Perkins,
HIV Nushawn: A New Age Typhoid Mary, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 13, 1997, at 15B
(discussing failure of prosecutors to obtain felony convictions against HIV-positive men who
had unprotected sex without disclosing HIV-infection).
1999]
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If Mr. Williams had infected these women in a different state, a far
more effective tool might be available to prosecutors. At least twenty-nine
states 1 4 have statutes that criminalize exposing an individual to the HIV virus
without disclosing HIV-positive status ("HIV transmission/exposure"
laws). While these statutes vary in terms of the particular conduct prohibited
and the degree of specificity of the statutory language, they share a common
purpose: to deter and punish those who spread a fatal disease ("HIV-
transmitters"). 5 Of course, their application is not limited to individuals like
Mr. Williams who have exposed only casual contacts, but extends to any
HIV-positive individuals who do not take care to protect others, including
loved ones, from exposure to the disease.
These statutes do have their drawbacks. 6 For example, they may
discourage testing, as an individual can only be guilty of the offense if he or
she knows he or she is HIV-positive. Also, enforcement of the statutes
may impede efforts to preserve the confidentiality of medical records. Fur-
thermore, broader statutes, such as those that include exposure to sweat and
other noninfectious bodily substances among the list of prohibited activities,
may further public misconceptions about what activities can spread the virus.
Also, these broad statutes arguably criminalize conduct having no possibility
of infecting a partner."8
Despite these significant disadvantages, HIV transmission/exposure statutes
are preferable to traditional criminal statutes as a means to punish and deter HIV
transmission and exposure 9 for several reasons. First, these statutes remove
many of the barriers to conviction posed by traditional criminal statutes to ensure
that guilty perpetrators will be punished. Addi-tionally, they signal to the public
14. According to the National Conference on State Legislatures, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington make it a felony to knowingly
transmit or expose another to HIV. Alabama, Kansas, Maryland, and Montana consider this a
misdemeanor offense, and North Dakota considers it an infraction. Lee Sanchez & Stephanie
Wilson, Criminalization of HIV Transmission and Exposure (Mar. 31, 1998)
<http://www.stateserv.hpts.orgtpublic/issueb.nsf/97e745f9e5ddca852564fOOO7b3abd/8921
b028fca1962852565c5005b60ad?OpenDocument>.
15. Most HIV transmission/exposure statutes, including the model statute contained in
the Appendix, prohibit other kinds of conduct like needle sharing or organ selling in addition
to exposure through sexual conduct. For the most part, consideration of other prohibitions is
beyond the scope of this paper.
16. See discussion infra Part III.C.
17. The issue of what constitutes knowledge is addressed infra Part III.A. 1.
18. See Thomas W. Tierney, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV. An
International Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L& COMP. L. REV. 475,487 (1991).
19. See id. at 512-13.
[Vol. 23:847
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that spreading the HIV virus is criminal conduct that will not be tolerated. By
specifically delineating to HIV-positive individuals what activities are prohibited,
states send a clear message that people who engage in risky behavior will be
prosecuted through the criminal laws.20 This is actually advantageous to HIV-
positive individuals, because they know exactly what conduct is, in fact,
prohibited, and what conduct is permissible. Under general criminal offenses,
HIV-positive individuals may avoid many non-risky activities because a broad
range of behavior could potentially satisfy the elements of an offense.
After awareness was raised by the Jamestown epidemic allegedly
caused by Mr. Williams, New York legislators began pushing for such a
law. Assemblyman Stephen B. Kaufman (82d District, Albany, NY) has
introduced legislation creating the crime of aggravated reckless
endangerment for individuals who knowingly expose others to IV through
uninformed sexual contact or needle sharing. The crime would be
punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment.21 The remaining twenty
states should follow suit, and establish the offense of "HIV
transmission/exposure,"' ' to ensure that those who knowingly expose others
to a fatal disease will be brought to justice.
II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE CRIMINAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH REMEDIES
A. General Criminal Offenses
It is sometimes possible to prosecute those who knowingly transmit the
HIV virus through existing criminal statutes.23 In fact, such prosecutions
1 20. Despite continued efforts at public education, there is disturbing evidence that
people are engaging in risky sexual practices. For example, a recent NEWSWEEK article reports
that there is a growing number of gay men, known as barebackers, who do not practice safe
sex. See Marc Peyser, A Deadly Dance, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1997, at 76-77. And a recent
Gallup poll shows that the number of Americans concerned about contracting AIDS has
dropped from 42% in October 1987 to 30% in October 1997. See Charles W. Henderson, HIV
Transmission (Health) Fear and Appraisal of Safe-Sex Warnings in NY Scare, AIDS WEEKLY
PLUS, Nov. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14715036.
21. Other HIV-related bills have been introduced in New York, including one that
would impose mandatory testing for prison inmates who attack prison guards (A.5795, 220th
Leg. (N.Y. 1997) (introduced by Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman, D-Brooklyn)), and another
that would weaken confidentiality laws to aid health agencies in their efforts to locate sex
partners of infected people (A.6629, 220th Leg. (N.Y. 1997) (introduced by Assemblywoman
Nettie Mayersohn, D-Queens)).
22. For a proposed statute, see Appendix infra.
23. Additionally, the victim of an HIV-transmitter may seek recourse through tort
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have been made in the past, sometimes successfully.24 Many of these
prosecutions involved HIV-positive individuals who knew of their respective
infections, and who bit other people, usually police officers or prison
guards.2 Depending on the conduct involved, criminal offenses such as
murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, assault, or
reckless endangerment might be used to prosecute those who expose others
to the HIV virus.
Some commentators have argued that these general criminal statutes are
appropriate for use in prosecuting HIV-transmitters. 26 A traditional murder
statute, for example, is generally applied to all sorts of homicides, regardless
of the particular circumstances or the weapons used. According to this
argument, the HIV virus is a deadly weapon like any other.27 Just as killing
someone with the use of a gun, knife, or hammer is considered to be murder,
so should killing someone with the use of the HIV virus be considered
murder. Under this view, general criminal statutes are as well suited for use
in HIV prosecutions as in any other crime.
However, HIV prosecutions are unlike those arising under other
circumstances. They involve unique considerations that render them ill
fitted for prosecution under general criminal statutes. Not only does each
general criminal offense contain elements that are difficult to prove in the
context of HIV prosecutions, but also the use of general criminal statutes is
disadvantageous to defendants and potential defendants.
24. See, e.g., State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the assault
convictions of an HIV-positive defendant who had engaged in unprotected oral, anal, and
vaginal intercourse); Zule v. State, 802 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the
conviction of an HIV-positive man who had anal intercourse with a minor). Additionally,
knowing exposure of others to HIV is sometimes considered an aggravating factor for
purposes of sentences imposed for the commission of other crimes such as sexual assault or
rape. See, e.g., State v. Guayante, 783 P.2d 1030, 1032 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987) (upholding the
assault conviction of an HIV-positive inmate who bit a corrections officer); State v. Smith,
621 A.2d 493 (N.J. 1993) (upholding the attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions
of an HIV-positive inmate who bit corrections officers); Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the aggravated assault with intent to murder conviction of a
person who bit a police officer).
26. See, e.g., Michael L. Closen & Jeffrey S. Deutschman, A Proposal to Repeal the
Illinois HIV Transmission Statute, 78 ILL. B. J. 592, 596 (1990).
27. In fact, in Texas, an HIV-positive defendant's penis and bodily fluids have been
held to be deadly weapons sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. See
Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). The Model Penal Code defines
"deadly weapon" as "any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance,
whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is
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The application of murder statutes to IV transmission demonstrates
that general criminal statutes are undesirable for use in prosecuting these
cases. Under the Model Penal Code,2' a defendant is guilty of murder where
he purposefully or knowingly caused the death of another human being, or
where such death is caused by an action "committed recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life."29 A conviction for murder requires that three elements be proved:
1) conduct; 2) state of mind; and 3) causation.30
The first element, proof of conduct, is the easiest to establish.31 It
requires a showing that the defendant engaged in the conduct that resulted in
I-V transmission. For example, it might involve the presentation of
evidence that the defendant did have sexual relations with the victim. It is
the second and third of these elements that pose barriers to effective
prosecution. 2
As to the second element, the perpetrator must have the intent to kill
through transmission of the IV virus. For first degree murder, the actor
must know of his or her IV-positive status, and must desire to spread the
virus to another person. This element may not be present in many IlV
transmission cases, as the goal of the perpetrator may not be to spread the
virus, but just to have sexual relations.3 Even where the perpetrator did plan
or hope to spread the virus, this is difficult to prove absent an admission by
the defendant.
Lesser degrees of murder require a knowing or reckless state of mind,34
which are perhaps easier to establish but are nonetheless
28. While many states do not follow the Model Penal Code, this paper will refer to
Model Penal Code definitions because of the wide variety of statutes that have been enacted
by the fifty states.
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1985). In states that have enacted the common
law, murder is defined as an unlawful killing with malice aforethought.
30. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1), (2) (1985).
31. For instance, in the Nushawn Williams case, Mr. Williams admitted to having had
sexual relations with many of the victims. James Barron, Officials Link Man to 11 Teen-Agers
With H.IV., NEw YoRK TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1997, at A2. In fact, he himself identified many of
them to public health officials. Id.
32. See Marvin E. Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being Criminalized, 3 CRIM.
JUST. 6, 8 (1988).
33. When an individual discharges a gun at someone's head or thrusts a knife at a
person's chest, the intent to injure or kill usually can be readily inferred from the conduct
itself. However, when an HIV-positive individual engages in sexual activity, such an intent
can not be presumed.
34. Common law states such as Maryland generally indicate what types of murder
constitute first degree, such as that committed in perpetration of a rape, see MD. CODE
ANN., Crimes and Punishments §§ 408-10 (Supp. 1998), and classify all types of murder that
do not fall into these categories as second-degree murder, see id. § 411.
1999]
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challenging. Reckless murder, for example, requires conscious awareness
both of HIV-positive status and of the risk of infecting another through the
contested behavior, accompanied by "extreme indifference to the value of
human life. 35  And knowing murder, which requires knowledge that the
conduct will result in death, is probably impossible to establish in light of
the fact that the virus is not transmitted by every sexual or other bodily
contact.36
Even where the requisite degree of intent can be shown, the third
element, causation, often presents an insurmountable barrier to conviction. It
is difficult to establish that the disease was contracted from the defendant,
especially where the victim has had multiple sexual partners or numerous
possible sources of infection.37 The potentially long period between
exposure and detection exacerbates this problem. It can take as long as ten
years before a victim develops symptoms of the HIV virus. Unless the
victim goes in for an HIV test before this time, he or she will not know until
long after that the criminal act has taken place. Even where the victim does
go in for testing absent symptoms, it can take as many as six months or more
before the victim is seropositive, meaning that the IIIV virus is detectable in
the blood.39  Given these obstacles, establishing causation may not be
possible.4°
The final challenge in prosecuting HIV-transmitters under traditional
murder statutes is that the prosecution cannot proceed until the victim
dies. Although HIV is invariably fatal, the victim may not die for many
years.4 Clearly, such a delay will significantly hinder both the prosecution
and the defense in a case brought under a murder statute. Also, many states
still follow the year and a day rule, whereby murder cannot be charged
unless the victim dies within a year and a day of the criminal activity.42
Further, given that the defendant also has the HIV virus, and necessarily
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (1985).
36. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the
State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139, 162-63 (1988).
37. For a discussion of the issues involved in proving even the relatedness of two
individuals' HIV-infections, much less evidence of causation. See State v. Schmidt, 699 So.
2d 448 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
38. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 966.
39. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 480-81.
40. See id. at 493.
41. According to research current in February 1996, 95% of people with HIV will die
within 12 years of contracting the disease. See Najera v. State, 955 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1997).
42. See State v. Minster, 486 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Md. 1985) (citing jurisdictions
retaining the year and a day rule).
[Vol. 23:847
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contracted it before the victim, it is likely that he or she will have died before
the prosecution can go forward, rendering the prosecution moot.
43
Prosecutions for HIV transmission under traditional murder statutes are
also unfair to defendants. In addition to the fact that they may take place
long after the actual exposure occurred, there may be no protection for
defendants who warned victims of their HIV-positive status. Because
consent is not a defense to murder, even those sexual contacts that took place
after full disclosure by the HIV-positive individual, and after a conscious
affirmance of the desire to proceed with the sexual encounter by the
"victim," would be considered criminal.44 Thus, HIV-positive individuals
are effectively banned from engaging in any sexual contact whatsoever, at
least with uninfected individuals. Any sexual contact, despite the degree of
disclosure and consent that might be present, would constitute murder under
traditional criminal murder statutes.45
Manslaughter prosecutions pose similar difficulties. Although a first
degree manslaughter prosecution does not require proof of an intent to
transmit the virus, but merely consciousness that certain conduct might result
in transmission, the mens rea element is still difficult to
establish. Moreover, the difficulties with causation that are present in
murder prosecutions are identical in manslaughter cases.
46
As with murder statutes, the use of manslaughter statutes is also
detrimental to the defendant. The jury must evaluate how a defendant
should have acted, resulting in the risk of prejudice and selective
enforcement.47  It is possible that a person could be convicted of
manslaughter even absent knowledge of BIV-positive status if the factfinder
determines that infection was due to behavior involving "a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor's situation." A jury that disapproves of certain lifestyles might
consider the commonplace practices of people who live that lifestyle as a
deviation from law-abiding conduct even where that conduct is perfectly
legal.
Use of negligent homicide statutes is also ill-advised. Since an
individual is guilty of negligent homicide when he ignores a risk of which he
should be aware, this offense could be used to prosecute those who do not
know of their HIV-positive status. While negligent homicide might be easier
to prove than murder, it would permit factf'mders, usually juries, to impose
43. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 492.
44. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 165.
45. Id.
46. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 494.
47. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 164.
48. MODELPENALCODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
1999]
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their interpretations of what constitutes "reasonable" conduct, and would
allow prejudice and discrimination to govern the determination of guilt.4 9
Prosecution under an assault statute can proceed before the death of the
victim, making both prosecution and defense easier in some
respects. However, similar requirements of intent and causation exist. The
defendant must have known of his or her HIV-positive status and have
believed that the disease could be spread through the conduct in question.50
Unless "likeliness" of transmission can be demonstrated, assault
prosecutions may not succeed. Additionally, "likeliness" may be hard to
establish. In Guevara v. Superior Court,51 a California judge granted the
defendant's motion to set aside the information as to the assault charges
because of the lack of proof that "one or two individual incidents of
unprotected sex between an HIV-positive male and an uninfected female
[was] ... 'likely to produce great bodily injury."' 52 Given that one incident
of unprotected sexual contact is not, in fact, "likely" to result in contraction
of the disease,53 jurisdictions that contain "likeliness" in their definition of
the crime may not be able to use assault to punish HIV-transmitters.5
One advantage of using assault statutes to prosecute HIV transmission
is that consent, participation in consensual sexual contact after disclosure of
HIV-infection, is probably a defense to assault.5 In Guevara, the court held
that the defendant, who knew he was HIV-positive, could not assert that the
victim, a minor, consented to the assault merely by participating in a
consensual sexual encounter with the defendant 6  The Guevara court,
however, did not address the situation where the defendant has disclosed his
HIV-infection status to the victim, leaving open the argument that disclosure
of HIV-positive status and procurement of consent to proceed before
engaging in sexual relations constitutes a defense to assault charges.
An additional, and substantial, disadvantage with each of the above
discussed criminal offenses (murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, and
assault) is that risky behavior that does not actually result in transmission
49. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 164-65.
50. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 498.
51. 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
52. Id. at 424.
53. There may be as little as a 1 in 500 risk of contracting HIV through sexual activity
absent aggravating factors like the presence of another sexually transmitted disease. See
Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal Exposure
Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921, 961 (1994).
54. Even where assault can be proven, it is only a misdemeanor crime. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 211.1(1) (1985). Assault may carry insufficient punishment, especially in those
circumstances where the transmission was purposeful or knowing.
55. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 168.
56. See Guevara, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423-24.
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will go unpunished. Unless the victim contracts the disease, the HIV-
infected individual is guilty of no crime, regardless of whether he intended to
infect or consciously disregarded the risk of infecting the victim. His
behavior, however, may be just as reprehensible as that of the individual
who actually did infect his partner. For this reason, murder, manslaughter,
and other criminal offenses requiring actual transmission are an insufficient
means of punishing those who expose others to ILv.
Attempt crimes such as attempted murder have the advantage that they
can be used to charge defendants where no actual transmission occurs. Even
absent transmission, a person who "does... anything with the purpose of
causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further
conduct on his part" may be guilty of an attempt crime." Thus, attempt
crime prosecutions can be pursued against individuals who engage in risky
behavior. Defendants who engage in like behavior are treated equally
regardless of whether HIV transmission occurs. Also, because actual
transmission is not required, the element of causation that poses such
problems in prosecutions for the choate crimes discussed above is
eliminated.
However, attempt crimes have disadvantages. They are hard to prove
because they require a strong showing of intent. Because attempt generally
requires a purposeful or knowing state of mind, at least under the Model
Penal Code, a person would have to have the goal of infecting another
individual, or knowledge that infection would, in fact, occur in order to be
found guilty.5s Not only is this a relatively rare occurrence within the scope
of HIV transmissions, 9 but it is also difficult to prove.6°
57. MODELPENALCODE § 5.01(1)(b) (1985).
58. In State v. Hinkhouse, 912 P.2d 921 (Or. Ct. App. 1996), for example, a conviction
for attempted murder and attempted assault was affirmed, but only because there was evidence
both that the defendant had stated his intent to spread the virus and that the defendant took
precautions including condom usage and disclosure when having relations with his future
wife, but not when intimate with other women. Id. at 925.
In another case, an attempted manslaughter charge against a prostitute was dismissed on
the grounds that attempt to engage in prostitution despite knowledge of HIV-positive status
could not be equated to the intent to kill. See State v. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d 1194, 1194 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
59. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 167.
60. In Smallwood v. State, 680 A.2d 512 (Md. 1996), for example, the Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed an HIV-positive defendant's conviction for attempted murder and assault
with intent to murder because the court found that there was insufficient evidence of intent.
Id. at 514. The court noted the absence of a statement of intent by the defendant,
distinguishing the case from others where the defendants "have either made explicit statements
demonstrating an intent to infect their victims or have taken specific actions demonstrating
such an intent and tending to exclude other possible intents." Id. at 516. While the defendant
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Additionally, because impossibility generally is not a defense, 61 attempt
crimes may be used to prosecute intent to transmit through biting or
spittin 6 2 These are activities that are unlikely to actually transmit the HIV
virus. Criminalizing these activities, then, reinforces erroneous beliefs
about transmission, thus undermining public education efforts.6' Further-
more, it punishes individuals who have not actually harmed anyone and who
could not have harmed anyone by the activity for which they are being
prosecuted.65 Prosecutions for this conduct may be warranted because some
of the perpetrators do, in fact, desire to infect another and may be quite
dangerous. The problem is that HIV-positive individuals prosecuted for
biting or spitting may not actually have intended harm, and may have been
fully aware that their actions were incapable of spreading the disease. This
concern is especially high where there is limited or no direct evidence, such
as incriminating statements, that reveal an intent to kill.
Reckless endangerment is arguably the easiest of traditional criminal
offenses to establish. It does not require a finding of actual transmission, 66
and thus, no proof of causation must be presented. Additionally, no intent or
purpose is required, but only that the defendant recklessly engaged in
conduct "which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.' 67
Reckless endangerment is also easier to establish than other crimes
because actual knowledge of HIV status may not be needed where the
defendant had symptoms and/or engaged in risky behavior. However, this
would probably have been found guilty under an HIV transmission/exposure law, as the court
noted that they "ha[d] no trouble concluding" that the defendant had knowingly exposed the
victim to the risk of an infection, the conviction for attempted murder had to be dismissed
because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had an intent to kill. Id. at 517 n.4.
61. See Closen, supra note 53, at 930.
62. Of the more than 10 attempted murder convictions for HIV transmission or
exposure around the country, most have involved biting or spitting. See Brown, supra note
11, at 10.
63. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health,
and Civil Liberties, 49 O1-1O ST. L.J. 1017, 1023-25 (1989).
64. See Closen, supra note 53, at 933-34.
65. In State v. Smith, 621 A.2d 493, 495 (N.J. 1993), for example, an attempted murder
conviction was affirmed despite the appellant's contention that he did not intend to transmit
the virus and did not believe it was possible to transmit the virus through a bite. Id. at 495-
96. The defendant specifically appealed his conviction to no avail on the grounds that HIV
could not be spread through a bite. Id.
66. In fact, prosecution under reckless endangerment statutes is possible even absent
any evidence that the defendant himself is actually infected. See Tierney, supra note 18, at
495. A sexually active homosexual male with HIV-like symptoms who engages in
unprotected intercourse may satisfy the elements of the crime. Id.
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985).
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poses a risk to potential defendants. There are serious negative ramifications
to holding people responsible for knowledge of HIV status merely on the
basis of their conduct, for this gives factfinders a dangerous opportunity to
discriminate against disfavored groups. 6' For example, it permits a
factfinder to equate homosexuality with BIV-positive status. Use of the
reckless endangerment statutes raises the possibility of a huge scope of
enforcement against all those who engage in high risk behavior. Like
manslaughter, this offense allows for a subjective jury determination of what
constitutes "reckless" behavior.
Not only can the offense of reckless endangerment be used to the
detriment of a criminal defendant, it also imposes burdens on the criminal
justice system in light of the difficult and potentially prejudicial evidentiary
requirements like past sexual history that might be implicated. 69 And like
assault, reckless endangerment is a misdemeanor, not a felony, which may
undermine its punitive and deterrent effects.70
In addition to the disadvantages in the use of general criminal offense
statutes as discussed above, there are no limitations on what conduct can
trigger a prosecution. With lIV transmission/exposure laws, prohibited
conduct is clearly delineated. 1 Under general criminal statutes, however,
prosecutors have broad discretion to pursue cases involving conduct that
should not be considered criminal. Not only is this situation disadvan-
tageous to potential criminal defendants, but it also creates a risk that the
public will harbor a negative view about the advisability of criminalizing
HIV transmission/exposure.72
B. Public Health Crimes
In several states, it is a crime to expose others to contagious diseases,
and in others, to expose others to sexually transmitted diseases.73 In some
respects, these statutes seem suitable for use in prosecuting HIV-
transmitters, as EIV is both sexually transmitted and contagious in certain
circumstances. Generally speaking, these crimes capture activity only by
those who knew of their infection, thus limiting the role of prejudice in lIlV
prosecutions.
68. See discussion infra Part IIM.A.1.
69. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 495-96.
70. See id. at 496.
71. See discussion infra Part III.
72. See Closen, supra note 53, at 935-36.
73. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-401(2) (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §
44-29-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-6-5 (1998).
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However, these statutes do not take into account the severity of the HIV
virus and the inevitability of death upon contraction. Unlike most other
sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") and most contagious diseases, HIV is
incurable and is invariably fatal. Many of these statutes are inadequately
lenient in terms of the punishment they impose on offenders, in some cases
providing for only a small fine for violations.
Additionally, like some of the statutes that are specific to HIV
transmission,74 some of these public health statutes are overly broad in the
sense that they criminalize conduct that cannot spread the HIV virus. 75
Sexually transmitted disease statutes are also, by definition, underinclusive
in light of the fact that HIV can be transmitted by nonsexual contact such as
needle sharing or blood transfusions.76
Finally, as with the use of murder statutes, which would, in effect,
criminalize all sexual contact regardless of consent, 77 many of these public
health statutes would require permanent abstinence. 78 Given that it is
possible to prevent or greatly limit the risk of contracting the disease through
safe sex practices, a permanent and unequivocal restriction on all sexual
contact is unnecessary.
C. Public Health Regulations
Some states seek to control HIV transmission through regulatory rather
than criminal provisions. Delaware, for example, has a number of regulatory
provisions governing the state's ability to quarantine infected persons or to
prohibit certain conduct by infected persons, in addition to provisions
relating to reporting, confidentiality, and required treatment.79 Like those of
other states, Delaware's public health provisions are not restricted to HIV,
but govern all contagious diseases.
74. See infra Part III.A.2.
75. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 170. For example, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
14:43.5(B) (West 1997) provides that "[n]o person shall intentionally expose another to any
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus through any means or contact," (emphasis
added), without defining what is meant by these terms. Because medical science often cannot
rule out the possibility, however infinitesimally small, that the virus cannot be transmitted by a
particular type of conduct, this statute could be interpreted to criminalize such things as a kiss.
76. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 170-71.
77. See discussion supra Part II.A.
78. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254-401(2) (West 1997) (stating: "It is
unlawful for any person who has knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that he is
infected with a venereal disease to... knowingly perform an act which exposes to or infects
another person .... ").
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 701-712 (1997).
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Some of these provisions give the state the power to isolate individuals
with the HIV virus from contact with other people.80 Because these
provisions are regulatory, not punitive, they are not subject to constitutional
restrictions barring cruel and unusual punishment or excessive bail under the
Eighth Amendment.8' Although it is conceivable that a state might seek to
segregate all those people infected with the IV virus,82 such a broad-
reaching provision is unlikely to be politically accepted,83 and it is not
constitutionally permissible under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 4 Quarantine provisions that provide for restriction only of those
lIV-infected individuals whose actions fall within the statute's guidelines,
on the other hand, might be constitutionally permissible.85  Those HIV-
positive individuals described as "incorrigible" or "recalcitrant," who
continue to engage in high risk behavior, might be subject to these behavior-
16based quarantines.
The goal behind these provisions is similar to that of using criminal
laws to control HIV: to prevent the spread of the disease and to deter HIV-
positive individuals from engaging in behavior with a high risk of
transmittal.87 However, there are several drawbacks to these provisions that
render them inferior to criminal prosecutions.8 These shortcomings include
constitutional concerns, insufficient protection of individual rights because
of lower evidentiary burdens, and the serious risk of selective enforcement.
For example, the standard of proof for civil confinement and other civil
public health remedies, which is "clear and convincing evidence," offers less
protection to the infected person than does the criminal "beyond a reasonable
80. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4-1401 to 1410 (West 1997); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-603 (1997).
81. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 145.
82. For example, Proposition 64 on the California Ballot, which was defeated on
November 4, 1986, would have allowed authorities to confine IV-positive individuals to
places designated for such purposes. After the AIDS Vote, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1986, at 4.
83. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 146-47.
84. Id. at 147.
85. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1036.
86. Id. While a behavior-based type of quarantine provision is in many respects
superior to a status based system, it poses the significant problem of requiring individualized
assessments of behavior. Because personal protections are minimal in the civil context,
behavior-based quarantine is undesirable.
87. One benefit of using quarantine provisions over criminal imprisonment is that,
because the individual will be in the company only of other HIV-positive individuals, the
individual cannot spread the disease to others, which could occur if he is imprisoned.
88. As Larry Gostin observes, "[b]ecause the virus is primarily transmitted by
intentional behavior that is within the control of the carrier, it is seen as susceptible to a legal,
rather than a public health, solution." See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1019.
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doubt" standard.89 Especially where there is the risk of prejudicial or selective
enforcement, and where people's liberty may be infringed by the proceedings,
the state should be held to a higher burden of proof. Because H1V is incurable,
use of these provisions might constitute a "civil life sentence," 9 and should be
subject to restraint and careful application.
Behavior-based quarantine is also ill-advised because it is unnecessarily
broad in terms of the restrictions it imposes. Unlike other contagious
diseases, HIV is not airborne nor is it transmitted by casual contact such as
touching or kissing.91 Thus, quarantine is an unnecessary remedy where
there is no evidence of behavior that has the capacity to transmit the virus. If
an individual has actually engaged in conduct that puts others at risk of
contracting a disease, he or she deserves to be punished. If not, the person is
merely an innocent victim of a terrible disease who is suffering enough
without being forced to submit to a proactive limitation on liberty through
quarantine. As Sullivan and Field observe, "AIDS is spread by acts, not by
mere proximity .... Criminal law punishes culpable acts, not statuses such
as being ill or infected. 92 As such, criminal laws more accurately restrict
only that behavior that is prohibited.
HIL HIV TRANSMISSION/EXPOSURE LAWS
Because traditional criminal statutes, public health offense statutes, and
public health regulations pose the difficulties discussed in Section II above
when applied to HIV exposure and transmission, statutes specifically
designed to capture the unique set of circumstances and issues surrounding
HIV exposure and transmission should be passed and utilized.93
A. What Are HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws and What Do They
Prohibit?
At least twenty-nine states have enacted statutes that specifically
criminalize knowingly exposing others to the HIV virus.94 These statutes,
89. See Closen, supra note 53, at 969-70.
90. Gostin, supra note 63, at 1029.
91. See id. at 1027.
92. Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 156.
93. In 1988, the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Epidemic concluded, after more than 48 hearings and a year of deliberation, that "HIV
infected individuals who knowingly conduct themselves in ways that pose significant risk of
transmission to others must be held accountable for their actions." Report of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic at XVII (1988).
94. See discussion supra Part I. For a discussion of international statutes addressing the
issue, see Tierney, supra note 18, at 502-10.
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while all attempting to serve a similar purpose, vary in several significant
respects. For one, some are broadly worded while others are very
specific. Also, there is variation as to what conduct is prohibited. For
example, some bar just the sale of IRV-tainted blood. Others punish those
engaging in a wide range of activities. The basic purpose of these statutes is
to criminalize specified conduct that poses a risk of spreading the HIV virus,
such as sexual intercourse, unless the infected party discloses his or her
IlV-positive status and obtains consent.
There are three elements that must be satisfied to be guilty of criminal
HIV transmission/exposure. 95 The first element is knowledge.96 A defendant
cannot be guilty of the crime unless he or she knows, or arguably should
know,97 that he or she is HIV-positive. The second element is that the
defendant must have engaged in prohibited contact such as intercourse or
oral sex. 98 The final element is the absence of a defense such as consent or,
95. A good statute will clarify, either in the text or legislative history, that it is meant to
be used in place of, not in addition to, traditional criminal offenses. See Closen, supra note
53, at 936. While such a provision raises questions about separation of powers and
prosecutorial discretion, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979), it
seems that state prosecutors would be bound to obey it, see People v. Ford, 417 Mich. 66, 80
(Mich. 1982) (looking to "several indications that the Legislature did not intend these [two]
statutes to be exclusive chargeable offenses"); People v. Ramsey, 218 Mich. App. 191, 193
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting defendant's claim that legislative enactment of a new statute
precluded conviction under other statute because language of new statute did not support
defendant's argument that other statute was precluded); People v. Little, 434 Mich. 752, 760
(Mich. 1990) (upholding prosecutor's decision to prosecute under two provisions because
"[t]he Legislature's enactment of [the two statutes] does not indicate any legislative intent to
limit the prosecutor's charging discretion.").
96. Another method of achieving the same goal is through a strict liability provision.
Such a law would provide that anyone who infects another with HIV is guilty of a criminal
offense, regardless of whether the perpetrator knew he or she was HIV-positive. This type of
provision would have several advantages to existing criminal transmission/exposure laws. It
would be easier to prove because no evidence of intent or mens rea of any kind would need to
exist nor would proof that the defendant had received notification of his HIV-positive status
be admissible. Additionally, there would be a strong deterrent against unprotected
sex. Similarly, a strict liability provision would encourage people to get tested frequently so
that they could be sure they were not putting others at risk of contraction of the
virus. However, there are also numerous disadvantages that militate against adoption of strict
liability criminal laws of this nature. A primary drawback is that, like most general criminal
offenses such as murder, proof of causation would be required. See discussion supra Part
II.A. Also, criminal remedies should not be applied where the defendant was not aware of the
criminal nature of his behavior, as this has no deterrent effect.
97. See discussion infra Part IlI.A.1.
98. This element of the crime poses the most difficulties from a drafting standpoint, and
is the subject of much of the disputes on criminal HIV exposure statutes.
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perhaps, condom usage.99 States take different approaches to resolving the
disputes around what satisfies these three elements)°° Some seek to provide
more precise guidelines, while others offer only a broad definition of the
offense.'0 '
1. Knowledge
HIV transmission/exposure statutes provide for criminal liability only
where the defendant knows of his HIV-positive status.1'2 Not every statute,
however, is specific as to what constitutes knowledge. 10 3 Some statutes
indicate that the knowledge provision can only be satisfied by positive
results from a blood test.' °4 Others do not specify what will be deemed
"knowledge."'
0 5
Where an individual has been tested and has been informed by medical
or public health personnel that he or she is HIV-positive, it seems
uncontroversial that the knowledge element of HIV transmission/exposure is
satisfied.' °6 The question is whether less than actual knowledge can satisfy
99. In a report published by the Archives of Internal Medicine, 40% of HIV-infected
people surveyed indicated that they did not disclose their HIV-positive status to sexual
partners, and 57% of these people also indicated they do not always use condoms. See Steven
Gray, Debate Looms on HIV Disclosure Laws: Is It Use of Deadly Weapon or Rights
Breach?, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 22, 1998, at 204.
100. States also provide different penalty levels for violations of their HIV
transmission/exposure laws. Of the 29 offenses established by state laws, 25 are felony crimes
of varying degrees, four are misdemeanors, and one is an infraction. See supra note 14.
101. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 1997). Because broad statutes may be
both vague and overbroad, see Closen, supra note 53, at 950-51, states should seek to draft
statutes with specific, precise prohibitions such as the one found in the Appendix.
102. There are two issues with regard to proof of infection. The first, addressed in this
section, involves the issue of when an individual has knowledge of his infection sufficient to
consider his actions criminal. The second relates to evidence of infection that can be admitted
at trial. It is in conjunction with this second area of HIV testing that disputes over the
advisability of mandatory testing arise.
103. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(1) (West 1997) (providing that creating risk
of infecting another with HIV is unlawful where the individual is "knowingly infected with
HIV"), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie 1995) (providing that a "person commits
the offense of exposing another to human immunodeficiency virus if the person knows he or
she has tested positive for human immunodeficiency virus").
104. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1995); NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.205
(1995); see also Appendix infra for Model Statute.
105. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1997).
106. Even positive test results might not be challenged as failing to satisfy the
knowledge requirement in some circumstances. For example, Nushawn Williams has claimed
that, although he did receive positive test results when he was tested by the Chautaqua County
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the statutory requirements. Is constructive knowledge sufficient? Gener-
ally, a person can be held to have constructive knowledge of a fact if the
exercise of reasonable care would have revealed that fact to that person.
10 7
There are three scenarios that might be sufficient to establish constructive
knowledge: symptoms, high-risk behavior, and a prior positive
partner. However, the use of any of these three means for establishing
constructive knowledge is ill-advised.
The first possibility for establishing constructive knowledge, the
existence of symptoms, is unsatisfactory because in many cases the
symptoms of HIV are similar to those of other common ailments such as the
common cold or flu.'08 Nonetheless, at least in the civil context, the
presence of symptoms may be enough to hold a defendant to constructive
knowledge.' 9 However, common symptoms such as weight loss, fatigue,
fevers, night sweats, diarrhea, and enlarged lymph glands"0 are insufficiently
distinctive to provide notice to the individual that he or she is infected with
the HIV virus.
Health Department in August 1996, he did not believe that these results were accurate. See
Barron, supra note 31, at A24. Instead, he believed that they were fabricated because officials
were 'just trying to get [him] out of town." Man With HIV Says Numbers Overstated, DALLAS
MORNiNG NEws, Nov. 6, 1997, at A28.
In the civil context, positive test results constitute actual knowledge sufficient to
establish a duty. See, e.g., Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
107. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 987 (citing Attoe v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins.
Co., 153 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Wis. 1967) (defining constructive knowledge as "that which one
who has the opportunity, by the exercise of ordinary care, to possess")). It is possible to argue
that persons who intentionally decline to determine their HIV-positive status can be imputed
with that knowledge. See Closen, supra note 53, at 965. In other words, a person who
deliberately avoids HIV testing, in the face of strong indications that he or she might be
infected, might not be able to point to the lack of official notification of HIV-positive status as
a lack of knowledge.
108. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 479.
109. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
110. See Schulman, supra note 7, at 987 n.206.
111. Some cases of HIV do involve identifiable symptoms such as lesions which, at
least when coupled with other things like long-term cold like symptoms or a history of high
risk activity, could reasonably provide a warning that an HIV test is advisable. See id. at 987-
88. Schulman proposes that constructive knowledge be deemed to exist where there are
identifiable or long-term symptoms, especially when coupled with conduct carrying a high risk
of transmittal in the absence of other possible medical explanations for the
symptoms. Id. Under Schulman's proposal, the existence of these factors should require an
immediate HIV test and abstention from sexual or other activity with the possibility of
transmittal of the virus until a negative result is obtained. Id. Schulman would also
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An individual might also be held to have constructive knowledge that
he is HIV-positive where he has engaged in high risk activities in the
past. This is the most controversial of the three possibilities for constructive
knowledge, as it looks not to actual warning signs but merely class wide
identifications. For example, under this method, anyone who had ever
engaged in anal intercourse might be deemed to have constructive
knowledge of HIV-infection. 12 Because of the serious risk of prejudicial
application, and the potential far-reaching coverage of such a definition of
knowledge, prior high risk activities should not be considered to provide
constructive knowledge of HIV-positive status.
113
The final circumstance under which an individual might be held to have
constructive knowledge of his or her HIV-infection is where that person is
aware that a previous sexual partner has the HIV virus. 14  Establishing
constructive knowledge by a prior sex partner's status is somewhat circular
in the sense that it raises the question of what would establish knowledge of
the other person's status. Is actual knowledge of positive results from a
blood test necessary? This method of constructive knowledge would require
an evidentiary showing that the person was informed of the prior partner's
status. It also requires an individual to assume infection from a wide range
of activities that might characterize someone as a prior sexual partner. Some
of these activities might carry a very negligible risk of transmission.
implement a "duty to investigate" in cases where even commonplace symptoms are coupled
with a history of high risk behavior. Id.
While this proposal has the advantage of encouraging testing and responsible sexual
behavior, it does not account for the potential unfairness of holding an individual responsible
for knowledge that he or she does not actually have, especially in the case of an uneducated
individual.
The model statute contained in the Appendix defines knowledge as actual knowledge of
a positive test result, or as having been told by a medical doctor that symptoms suggest an
HIV-infection and that HIV testing is advisable. This provision is designed to encourage
testing and to minimize an individual's ability to avoid prosecution by refraining from
obtaining actual knowledge through a positive test result.
112. For example, in one case, a Florida court held that a man's homosexual orientation
and activity should be sufficient for the man to believe himself to be HIV-positive. See
Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
113. See Closen, supra note 53, at 966.
114. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (W.D. Mich. 1993). This language
is criticized in Schulman, supra note 7, at 990, on the grounds that it is unclear whether a
prior sex partner constitutes anyone with whom an individual has had some sort of sexual
contact, or only those with whom vaginal intercourse has taken place. Id. Schulman would
require testing of anyone who had engaged in vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse with an
infected person. Id. Schulman's proposal is thus more of a mandatory testing proposal than
one of constructive knowledge.
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In a given case, some combination of symptoms, risk factors, and
knowledge of direct exposure from an infected partner might provide
sufficient evidence that the individual had knowledge beyond a reasonable
doubt of his or her infection. However, the risk of allowing consideration of
such variable factors is that they will be used prejudicially and
arbitrarily. For example, a factfinder might determine that prior homosexual
intimate conduct with the use of a precaution like a condom was nonetheless
sufficient to provide constructive knowledge. Another factfinder might
decline to find constructive knowledge where unprotected heterosexual
intimate conduct was a part of the individual's history. For this reason,
constructive knowledge should not be satisfactory to establish criminal
culpability.
A good HIV transmission/exposure statute will be specific as to what
constitutes knowledge. It will provide that only actual knowledge obtained
from a test conducted on the individual's blood by medical or public health
personnel, or strong indications from a doctor that testing is advisable
because of tell-tale HIV symptoms,"15 will constitute knowledge sufficient to
establish criminal culpability.
2. Prohibited Activity
Another area where specificity is valuable is in determining what
activities are prohibited under the statute. Some statutes lay out very clearly
the types of contacts that will suffice to establish criminal culpability, while
others are not as precise.11 6  Prohibited activities may include vaginal,
genital, or anal intercourse, the sale or transfer of blood, sperm, tissue,
organs, or plasma, and exchange of unsterile needles.
Because these statutes criminalize exposure, not merely transmission, it
is important to specify what activities are prohibited. 7  Otherwise, the
specter of possible prohibited activity looms too large. For example, could
shaking hands constitute criminal conduct where both people's hands are
sweaty?" 8 What about an lIlV-positive person who sneezes on someone
accidentally? Does a pelvic exam by an obstetrician/gynecologist constitute
"sexual penetration" under the statute?119 A good statute will lay out in
115. See Appendix infra for Model Statute.
116. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (1997) (providing detailed list of
prohibited activities), with NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.205(1) (1995) (prohibiting engaging in
"conduct in a manner that is intended or likely to transmit the disease").
117. See Tiemey, supra note 18, at 498.
118. See Closen & Deutschman, supra note 26, at 592.
119. See Closen, supra note 53, at 952-53.
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detail what conduct is prohibited, and will restrict prohibited conduct to that
which actually poses the risk of transmitting the HIV virus.
Some of these provisions criminalize acts like biting or spitting. In
some respects, biting cases do involve some of the most clear-cut HIV
transmission cases because there is often evidence of the intent to
transmit.'2 On the other hand, there are no documented cases of
transmission from a bite, even where the skin has been broken.121 Similarly,
spitting has not been shown to have caused HIV-infection, as saliva contains
very small quantities of HIV.1
22
Because there are no confirmed cases of HIV transfer from these
activities, they should not be criminalized in HIV transmission/exposure
laws.2 3 While the common law doctrine of impossibility would not bar a
conviction under most HIV transmission/exposure laws, the fact that it is
medically impossible to transmit the virus through biting or spitting render
these activities inappropriate for inclusion in HIV transmission/exposure
laws.
Some of these provisions would also criminalize the prenatal transfer of the
HIV virus from a mother to a child.12 Childbirth has one of the highest rates of
120. In many of the biting cases, there is evidence that the defendant verbalized his
intent to transmit the virus. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D.
Minn. 1987), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that after the biting incident,
"defendant stated that he intended to kill the officers"); State v. Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding admission of evidence that defendant had stated his intent to
transmit AIDS even though defendant did not have the disease).
In another case, where the defendant had "sucked up excess sputum" before biting a
police officer, the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for aggravated
assault with intent to commit murder. Scroggins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990).
121. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 484.
122. See id. at 485.
123. In the right circumstance, a person could be prosecuted under a general criminal
statute if his conduct did not fall within the state's HIV transmission/exposure law but
nevertheless was criminal in nature. For example, in United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163
(8th Cir. 1988), the court affirmed the assault conviction of an HIV-positive inmate who bit
two corrections officers, even though "the medical evidence in the record was insufficient to
establish that AIDS may be transmitted by a bite." Id. at 1167-68. The court justified this
result on the grounds that the jury was entitled to consider the defendant's mouth and teeth to
be a deadly weapon even if the defendant was not HIV-positive. Id. at 1167.
124. However, prosecution should remain possible where appropriate under general
criminal laws for the actual activity in which the individual has engaged, e.g., assault for a
bite.
125. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1995). For a complete discussion
of the subject of the criminalization of prenatal transfer of HIV, see Deborah A.
Wieczorkowski Wanamaker, From Mother to Child... A Criminal Pregnancy: Should
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transmission, ranging between twenty and fifty percent, as compared with a 1 in
500 risk of contracting the disease through sexual activity.126 However, because
transmission from mother to child occurs before birth as well as during birth,
prenatal transfer should not be included within HIV transmission/exposure
statutes because it would effectively bar HIV-positive women from bearing
children despite the fact that they have a better than even chance of delivering a
healthy baby.127 Additionally, it might be used to prosecute women who discover
they are HIV-positive after conception, thereby forcing women to obtain
abortions so as to avoid criminal liability.28 Furthermore, given that no
contraceptive is foolproof in preventing pregnancy, criminalization of prenatal
transfer might effectively require permanent abstinence. Finally, such a ban
would logically have to be extended to couples with a high risk of passing a
genetic disorder to a child. For these reasons, prenatal transfer should be
exempted from inclusion in HIV transmission/exposure laws.
Breast-feeding, however, should be considered a prohibited
activity. Although the risk of HIV transmission is slight, it is possible that
the virus can be spread through breast milk.129 Because there is a viable
alternative to breast-feeding, namely the use of formula, the health of
children should not be endangered by this activity.
3. Defenses - Consent and Condom Usage
Many HIV transmission/exposure statutes provide that consent is a
defense to the crime.130 In other words, if the defendant informed the victim
that he or she was IV-positive and the victim consented to participating in
the sexual contact despite this fact, the defendant is not guilty of a crime. At
least as to sexual conduct,' 31 this is as it should be, because the goal of
Criminalization of the Prenatal Transfer of AIDSIHIV Be The Next Step In the Battle Against
This Deadly Epidemic?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 383 (1993).
126. See Closen, supra note 53, at 960-61.
127. On the other hand, the argument can be made that women should not have the
right to bring numerous HIV-positive babies into the world, putting a huge stress on the health
care system, and costing the public millions of dollars.
128. See Wanamaker, supra note 125, at 404.
129. See Closen, supra note 53, at 977-78 (citing Van de Perre et al., Mother to Infant
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus By Breast Milk: Presumed Innocent or
Presumed Guilty, 15 CaNIcAL INFEouS DISEASES 502 (1992)).
130. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a)
(1997). Even those statutes that do not specifically establish consent as a defense may
implicitly allow for such an argument to be raised. See Closen, supra note 53, at 945.
131. As to other activities such as needle sharing, consent should not necessarily be a
defense. Consent is not even a consideration in the context of prenatal transfer, as a fetus is
obviously unable to consent to the risk of infection.
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criminal transmission/exposure provisions is to ensure that no unsuspecting
person is exposed to the HIV virus without being given the opportunity to
take precautions or to avoid the risk. The purpose of the laws is not to
require an HIV-positive person to be abstinent for the remainder of his or her
life. As Closen, et al., observed, society often allows participation in even
132dangerous activity when consent is given.
A further issue is whether consent is an affirmative defense or
whether absence of consent is an element of the crime that needs to be
proven by the prosecution. Some statutes specifically provide that consent
is an affirmative defense, thereby putting the burden on the defendant to
prove consent.1 33 Other statutes include lack of consent as an element of
the offense, indicating that it is the prosecution's burden to prove absence
of consent.134 Many HIV transmission/exposure cases turn on the issue of
consent, and thus the placement of the burden of proof may be
dispositive.1 35 Because the ramifications of falsely convicting a defendant
are so serious, the burden of proving consent should not be shifted to the
defendant, but rather should remain on the prosecution, as it does for other
crimes, like rape, where consent is often the contested issue. Lack of
consent is best seen as an element of the offense, not an affirmative
defense.
In addition to consent, another potential defense is that the defendant
used a condom when engaging in sexual contact, thereby preventing
transmission of the disease. A defendant might try to offer this as a
defense even where no disclosure of infection was made. The advantage of
allowing this as a defense is that HIV-positive individuals could preserve
their privacy and confidentiality. The problem is that condoms are not
132. See Closen, supra note 53, at 947-48.
133. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a) (1997) (stating: "It is an affirmative defense
that the sexual activity took place between consenting adults after full disclosure by the
accused of the risk of such activity."). A Florida judge, in the course of sentencing an HIV-
positive man to one year of probation for having sex with a minor, ordered the man, who had
boasted about his active sexual lifestyle, to obtain written consent from partners before
engaging in sex. See Man With HIV Must Get Written Consent For Sex, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
1998, at A28.
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie 1995) ("A person commits the
offense of exposing another to human immunodeficiency virus if the person... exposes
another.., without first having informed the other person of the presence of the human
immunodeficiency virus.").
135. See Closen, supra note 53, at 945.
136. A supplemental question is whether condom usage should be required of all sexual
contact involving HIV-positive individuals.
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infallible when it comes to preventing IUV transmission, 137 and so the use of
condoms should not be able to suffice as a defense. In other words, the use
of a condom should not replace the need to disclose HIV-positive status.
B. Advantages of HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws
In general, ILV transmission/exposure statutes have many advantages
over generally applicable criminal laws as applied to IUV transmission and
over public health related criminal and regulatory provisions. They are
preferable in that they make prosecution easier and more successful, they
offer better protection to society from HIV-transmitters, and they are more
fair to the criminal defendant.
Because criminal HIV transmission/exposure does not require that the
victim actually contracts the HIV virus, but rather that the defendant engages
in an activity that puts the victim at risk of such transmission, many
problems associated with the use of general criminal laws are avoided. For
one, there is no need to prove that a victim contracted the HIV virus from the
defendant, thereby avoiding difficult evidentiary issues involving the
victim's other sexual contacts or potential sources of infection. Prosecution
can be pursued immediately rather than only after HLV antibodies are
detectable in a victim's blood. Thus, no lag in charging will exist. Also,
unlike with murder or manslaughter, there is no need to wait for the death of
the victim before charging or prosecution.
138
Criminal transmission/exposure laws also allow legislatures to
determine what the proper degree of punishment is for exposing another to
HIV. These statutes can provide for punishment less strict than murder,
which should be treated more harshly in light of the fact that it requires a
showing of intent. On the other hand, punishment can be more severe than is
provided for assault or reckless endangerment, which is appropriate because
FHV exposure will often result in the death of the victim.
Guilt is also easier to establish than with general criminal offenses
because there is no intent requirement. The defendant need not have wanted
or planned to spread the IV virus or even have thought about whether
transmission may result from their actions. Because responsible behavior
and conscious consideration of the risks of transmission on the part of IV-
137. "[C]ondoms are susceptible to breakage, spillage, seepage, defective
workmanship, and improper usage." Schulman, supra note 7, at 986. Nonetheless, the risk of
transmitting HIV from one sexual encounter with the use of a condom, assuming a 90%
effective rate, is estimated to be 1 in 10,000. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1022.
138. See Gostin, supra note 63, at 1042 n.129.
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positive individuals is desirable, this aspect of HIV transmission/exposure
laws benefits society.
39
Another advantage to HIV transmission/exposure laws is that there is
greater deterrent effect by having a specific statute.140 Even absent a public
prosecution of a criminal HIV exposure offender, the existence of an HIV
specific statute on the books makes it clear to putative offenders that risky
conduct will not be tolerated. Absent such a clear signal, some HIV-
transmitters may not even be aware of the criminal nature of their conduct.
Not only is this advantageous to society because undesirable behavior
will be deterred, it is also beneficial to those HIV-positive individuals who
are engaging in conduct that puts them at risk of prosecution under a general
criminal statute. While the illegality of uninformed sexual contact may not
be apparent in a jurisdiction without an HIV transmission/exposure statute, a
jurisdiction that does have such a law provides notice to HIV-positive
individuals that they are at risk of being prosecuted if they engage in certain
specified conduct. Thus a deterrent effect will be realized even if
prosecutions are not more frequent or more successful than under general
criminal laws, simply because of the public educational benefit of enacting
an HIV transmission/exposure law.' 4'
Potential defendants also benefit from the existence of an HIV
transmission/exposure statute in the sense that it is less subject to
prejudicial application.' Because the statute itemizes what conduct is
prohibited, selective prosecutions are more apparent. In contrast, a
prosecutor's decision to forgo prosecution against one individual under a
general criminal statute while pursuing it against another may escape
detection. At a minimum, the non-specific nature of a general criminal
statute may allow the prosecutor to justify his actions. A specific law is,
therefore, less arbitrary.
139. In light of the fact that individuals are held responsible for realizing the dangers of
transmittal through certain contact, medical and public health personnel should inform people
of methods of transmission at the time that positive test results are given.
140. Some commentators have argued that this deterrent effect may not actually exist or
that it is overstated. See, e.g., Closen & Deutschman, supra note 26, at 593.
141. Deterrence through education of the illegality of HIV exposure is especially
significant because HIV-positive individuals, as a group, are likely to be less susceptible to
deterrence than the general population because of their short life expectancy. Coupled with
the increased likelihood that prosecutions will be successful under a transmission/exposure
law, the tendency of many people to avoid criminal activity makes public education of the
illegality of exposure an effective route to achieving deterrence.
142. See Closen, supra note 53, at 950.
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C. Disadvantages of HIV Transmission/Exposure Laws
Despite the many advantages of HIV transmission/exposure laws, there
are some drawbacks. 43 The primary one is that there is the potential that the
existence of such statutes may discourage individuals from getting
tested. 44 Especially under a statute that provides for criminal culpability
only where there is actual, and not merely constructive, knowledge of HIV-
positive status, people may avoid receiving official notification of their
infection so as to be able to engage in behavior which otherwise would be
prohibited. 45 The model statute in the Appendix seeks to limit this problem
by holding people responsible for knowledge where they have been told by a
doctor that their symptoms may indicate HIV-infection and that they should
be tested.
Another disadvantage of the use of HIV specific laws is that it raises
issues with regard to the confidentiality of medical records. In their efforts
to prosecute HIV transmission/exposure, prosecutors must obtain evidence
that the defendant knew of his or her EIV-positive status. However, in some
states such information is protected by confidentiality statutes that protect146
the defendant's medical records. Even where not protected by statute, the
preservation of confidentiality is of crucial importance in encouraging
people to get tested. By the very act of prosecuting an individual for
criminal HIV transmission/exposure, the state is disclosing that individual's
IV-infection. 47  Because of concerns about confidentiality, HIV
transmission/exposure prosecutions should only be permitted where the
crime is brought to the government's attention by a complaining witness or
some other means outside the public health reporting system. The disclosure
of confidential medical records in pursuance of a prosecution should be as
143. Some of these issues can be resolved with a carefully drafted statute. See
Appendix infra for Model Statute.
144. See Closen, supra note 53, at 964-65.
145. See id. at 967. One method of avoiding this problem is by providing for
mandatory testing of certain individuals such as those accused of another crime. For
discussion of the issues raised by mandatory testing provisions, see Michael P. Bruyere,
Damage Control for Victims of Physical Assault-Testing the Innocent for AIDS, 21 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 945 (1994).
146. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-4-1404 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-502.2 (West 1997). Some confidentiality statutes provide that prosecutors do have
access to otherwise confidential test results. See State v. Stark, 832 P.2d 109, 112-13 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 70.24.105 (West 1992)).
147. In fact, an Illinois court held in In re Multimedia KSDK, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 911 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991), that the Illinois confidentiality statute did not bar a television station from
broadcasting the identity of an HIV-positive individual because she was a defendant in a case
being pursued under Illinois' HIV transmission/exposure statute. Id. at 912.
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limited as possible, and conducted in a manner designed to preserve the
defendant's confidentiality.
It should be noted that confidentiality concerns are not reserved to
prosecutions involving HIV-specific statutes. Any prosecution for exposing
or transmitting the HIV virus may necessitate the disclosure of medical
records. In fact, even where no prosecution takes place, issues of
confidentiality may arise. For example, in order to publicize Nushawn
Williams' HIV-positive status and the epidemic of HIV cases that were
cropping up in Jamestown, New York, public health officials utilized a
previously unused statute that permitted the disclosure of confidential Hv
test records upon court order.'
41
Not only do these confidentiality provisions pose serious privacy issues
with regard to HIV-transmitters, but they also may require disclosure of
victims' private medical information. 49 It is possible that, in an effort to
track the criminal activity of an HIV-transmitter, police and prosecutors may
attempt to trace back exposure and transmittal of the disease through
victims. 50 Where transmission has occurred, this infringement on privacy
might even extend to other sexual partners of the victim in order to rule out
other possible sources from which the victim might have contracted the
disease.' 5' However, the privacy of third parties is less likely to be infringed
by HIV transmission/exposure prosecutions than by general criminal offense
prosecutions, because a finding of guilt under a transmission/exposure law
requires only exposure, not actual transmission, so the victim's HIV status is
not a necessary piece of evidence.
Because HIV transmission/exposure crimes often arise in the context of
intimate personal situations, constitutional privacy concerns are also
148. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2785(2)(c) (McKinney 1997), which took effect in
1988, allows broad public disclosure of the identity of an infected person in cases of "clear
and imminent danger to the public health." See Bill Alden, Albany Begins Drive to Lift HIV
Confidentiality, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at 1; Lynda Richardson, Public Health Cited in
Breaching H.IV. Confidentiality, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 29, 1997, at B8. Statutes like this one are
found in many states.
149. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 36, at 188-89.
150. Id.
151. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 488. However, in Weaver v. State, 939 S.W.2d 316
(Ark. Ct. App. 1997), the court declined to allow the HIV-positive defendant to ask questions
relating to the victim's other sexual encounters. Id. at 318. The defendant, who had
intercourse without disclosing his HIV-positive status despite the fact that he was informed
that this would be a crime, was convicted under ARK. CODE. ANN. 5-14-123 (Michie 1993),
and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Id. at 317.
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implicated.1 52 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that states may
regulate consensual sexual activity between adults. 53 Additionally, several
courts have held, in various contexts, thatprivacy concerns can be trumped
by the state's interest in public health.'5 At least one state court, the
Supreme Court of Illinois, has upheld the constitutionality of its H1Y
transmission/exposure law in People v. Russell,155 where it was challenged
on First Amendment grounds. 56
The existence of these criminal laws may also undermine efforts to
extend treatment to all infected individuals. Many of these people are
already hesitant to bring their disease to the attention of public health
workers and medical personnel, and may go even further underground.
Finally, as with prosecutions under general criminal offense statutes,
HIV transmission/exposure laws could be used discriminatorily against
politically disfavored groups like homosexuals. Although selective pro-
secution is less likely under an H1V transmission/exposure law than under a
general criminal statute, it is still a possibility. Even in states where sodomy
is legal, the existence of EIV transmission/exposure laws might allow
government agents to prevent such activity. 5 7 Not only is this discrimin-
atory behavior unfair to those groups that are negatively impacted by it, but
also it may be counterproductive to the overall goal of slowing the spread of
the disease. Homosexuals, for example, may avoid obtaining testing and
treatment for fear of being targeted for investigation and/or prosecution.
51
To minimize the potential for selective enforcement, HIV
transmission/exposure laws should be drawn to limit prosecutorial
discretion, 59 and the legislative histories of such laws should clearly indicate
that the goal is to prevent prohibited conduct by all groups equally.
152. An individual's right to privacy in matters involving procreation and sexual
activity was recognized in such cases as Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68 (1969),
and Griswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965).
153. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
154. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
privacy right is "outweighed by the state's right to enact laws which promote public health and
safety"); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
the right of privacy is sometimes "subordinate to the state's fundamental right to enact laws
which promote public health, welfare and safety, even though such laws may invade the
offender's right of privacy") (citing Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal.Rptr. 422, 430 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983)).
155. 630 N.E.2d 794(111. 1994).
156. Id. at 795-96.
157. See Tierney, supra note 18, at 488-89.
158. See idL at 489.
159. One method for limiting prosecutorial discretion is for the statute to permit
enforcement only upon a victim's request to law enforcement authorities. See id. at 512. This
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the disadvantages discussed above, an HIV transmission/
exposure law should be passed and utilized in every jurisdiction because it
best ensures that those individuals who expose others to a fatal disease will
be held responsible for their actions. HIV is a fatal disease, one which is
currently both unpreventable and incurable. Without the use of HIV
transmission/exposure laws, many Americans will be exposed to the disease,
both by those who do not know that exposure is illegal and by those who do
not care. Many of these people will contract the disease and die. Simply by
adopting HIV transmission/exposure laws, the message will spread,
hopefully faster than the disease itself, that society considers HIV exposure
to be unacceptable behavior. And where prosecution is nonetheless
necessary, use of the laws will offer prosecutors an increased likelihood of
success, but only in those cases where prosecution is truly warranted.
To be certain, the effort to prosecute HIV-transmitters and exposers will
necessitate some infringement on confidentiality and privacy. However, this
disadvantage, while significant, should not deter the enactment of HIV
transmission/exposure laws. The same criticism applies to general criminal
laws, perhaps to an even greater extent, as HIV transmission/exposure laws
do not require proof of actual transmission and offer better protections
against discriminatory enforcement. When balanced against the certainty of
death if the HIV virus is spread to uninfected individuals, the interests of
confidentiality and privacy must be trumped.
The model statute contained in the Appendix seeks to capture the
benefits of HIV transmission/exposure laws while minimizing their
disadvantages. Specifically, it provides clear definitions of what constitutes
knowledge, what activities are and are not prohibited, what will be
considered a defense to the crime, and when the statute should be
utilized. This HIV law is superior to general criminal laws because it
provides notice to potential defendants, reinforces societal norms against
dangerous behavior, deters individuals from engaging in such behavior,' 6°
and punishes those who do so anyway.
Nushawn Williams might not have engaged in unprotected intercourse
with so many women had he known that such activity was illegal. And if he
limitation is not without downsides of its own, most notably that it permits or perhaps even
encourages people to threaten former or current partners with the prospect of
punishment. The remedies for this concern, which is by no means exclusive to
transmission/exposure laws, is merely a careful prosecutorial screening process and the
placement of the burden of proof for all elements of the crime, including lack of consent, on
the prosecution.
160. See id. at 486-87.
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had nevertheless done so, prosecutors in New York would have a much
greater chance to get a conviction and to put him in prison for his despicable
actions. While punishing Mr. Williams will not give his victims back the
lives he allegedly took, it will help treat the disease that afflicts America
today: the willingness of some HIV-positive individuals to expose others to
a fatal disease. HIV transmission/exposure laws cannot cure our nationwide
problem of HIV transmission and the difficulties of punishing and deterring
it, but until a medical cure for HIV is found, ILV transmission/exposure
laws are the best options we have available.
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V. APPENDIX - MODEL STATUTE
Sec. 1 - Criminal HIV transmission/exposure.
A. A person is guilty of the crime of HIV transmission/
exposure when that person has knowledge that he or she is infected
with the HIV virus and exposes another person to that virus without
the consent of that other person.
B. Violation of Sec. 1.A is a class B felony, punishable by
[insert incarceration term consistent with that of other offenses].
C. Prosecution for conduct that constitutes exposure under this
Section precludes prosecution under any other Section of the State
Code for the same conduct.
D. Definitions to be applied to Sec. .A.:
1. "Knowledge" means that the person has been
informed by a medical or public health official, including but
not limited to a doctor, nurse, health department worker, or
designated representative of a home HIV testing company
licensed by the Federal Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), that his or her blood tests positive for the antibodies
indicating that he or she is infected with the HIV virus; or that
the person has been informed by a medical doctor both that he
or she has symptoms indicating the possibility that he or she
has been infected with HIV and that he or she should obtain an
HIV test to confirm or disprove this potential diagnosis.
Prosecution under this Section shall not proceed in the
absence of knowledge of HIV infection as herein defined.
2. "Infected with the HIV virus" means that the person
has the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"), or any related virus
or syndrome such as AIDS-Related Complex.
3. "Exposes" means that the person engages in one of
the following types of conduct, and no other type of conduct:
a. Sexual activity consisting of any direct contact
between the mouth, tongue, genitals, or anus of one person
and the genitals or anus of another, regardless of whether
condoms or other protective measures are utilized.
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b. Exchange, donation, sale, or any other type of
transfer to another individual of a drug needle or syringe
that has been utilized by the HIV-infected individual for
injecting a substance or otherwise piercing his or her skin
and has not subsequently been sterilized.
C. Donation, sale, gift, or any other type of transfer
to another person or entity of the tissues, blood, organs,
semen, breast milk, or other bodily substance for the
purposes of transplantation, transfusion, insemination, or
feeding. Transfer of bodily substances to medical
professionals for the purpose of testing or medical research
shall not constitute prohibited conduct under this Section,
nor shall in utero transmission from a mother to a child
constitute prohibited conduct under this Section.
4. "Consent" means that a person over the age of
majority has disclosed his or her HIV-positive status to the
other person and that other person has affirmatively agreed to
participate in the conduct constituting exposure under Section
1.D.3. Agreement by a minor to participate in the conduct
constituting exposure does not constitute consent. The
prosecution bears the burden of proving lack of consent.
5. A person is guilty of criminal HIV
transmission/exposure if Section 1.A. is satisfied, regardless of
whether or not actual transmission has taken place.
NOTES AND HISTORY
The purpose of this section is to prohibit conduct that has the potential
of transmitting the HIV virus. As such, it has been drawn to specifically
delineate the conduct that constitutes criminal behavior and to exclude types
of conduct, such as biting or spitting, which do not have the capacity to
transfer the virus.
It is the goal of the legislature that this section will be applied evenly
against all types of people and that it will not be used selectively against
certain groups. As such, prosecutors should use careful discretion when
applying this section in the absence of a complaint from a victim.
Additionally, this section does not circumvent or in any way alter the
provisions of the state's confidentiality statute. Prosecutors must adhere to
the provisions laid out in that section of the state code and should take every
precaution to preserve the confidentiality of offenders and victims alike.
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